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1
In his early writings, Marx develops, in part with Frederick Engels, the notion 
of ideology for the purpose of overcoming the philosophy of his time. The dis-
sociation of the Marxian discourse from philosophy, this desire to overcome 
philosophy, finds one of its culminations in the 11th thesis on Feuerbach, which 
states with excessive clarity: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, 
in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.”1
This clarity is excessive, especially as Marx in his early writings at no point de-
velops a discussion on the question of philosophy as such, but rather thorough-
ly attacks the philosophy of his time, mainly the leftovers of the Hegelian dis-
course and the young Hegelians’ attempts to understand the world according to 
the concepts of the mind. ‘Philosophy’ in the early Marx is the philosophy of the 
young Hegelians. At a certain point the disagreement with this type of philoso-
phy seems to spread into philosophy as such.
The young Hegelians, followers of the philosophy Marx is concerned with, are 
criticised regarding two main aspects. Firstly, they invert the relation between 
mind and world; following Hegel, they seek to explain everything on the grounds 
of concepts of consciousness. But secondly, even worse is their assertion of the 
independence of the concept. The young Hegelians take the concept to be an 
independent reality of its own value, and this means that they understand the 
concept to be built upon its own force. Thought becomes autonomous. 
Ideology, of which philosophy is the strongest expression, can be understood as 
a critical notion that is directed against these two characteristics of the young 
1 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach”, in: Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader, 
2nd edition, Norton, New York/London 1978, pp. 143–145, here p. 145.
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Hegelian current. It critically denounces the inversion of the relation between 
reality and concept, as it critically denounces the apparent independence and 
autonomy of the concept, seemingly relying on its own forces. A combination of 
two aspects might at first view appear, at least in part, to be tautological, as the 
second moment – the apparent independence of the concept – could be under-
stood as already implying the first moment, namely the inversion of the relation 
between reality and concept. One might argue that a concept that is built on its 
own forces implicitly positions the world to be a consequence of concepts.
But the second criterion is an intensification of the critique that Marx and En-
gels utter. The young Hegelians understand a change of the world as a change 
in consciousness, and thus they follow Hegel as they begin from the point of 
consciousness, but they also take the concepts of consciousness to be a reality 
of their own. Reality becomes the reality of consciousness, and this means that 
a change of consciousness is a change of reality.
From this point, it seems evident that the only possible rejection of this structure 
of philosophy has to be its reorientation towards the real reality. What needs to 
be done is to reorient the inverted relation between world and mind and to crit-
icise the apparent autonomy of the mind. Thus, the discourse of philosophy, i.e. 
the discourse of the apparent autonomy of the mind, needs to be overcome by a 
discourse of reality. And this is the programme of the early Marx: Reality condi-
tions the mind, and this means that reality precedes the mind and the mind con-
sequently cannot be conceived of as independent. This programme has often 
been criticised; not only are the debates on the question of the humanism of the 
early Marx implied here, but also Marx’s and Engels’s emphasis on the reality 
of life has often been rejected. Althusser, for example, denounced the context of 
the notion of ideology as “plainly positivist.”2
Although Marx and Engels do indeed stress the notion of real life in an empiri-
cist tone in The German Ideology, as well as the science of real life, and although 
they juxtapose it with the ‘phrases’ of philosophy, this opposition between real-
2 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, in: Lenin and Philosophy, 
and other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster, Monthly Review Press, New York 1971, pp. 127–186, 
here p. 159.
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ity and philosophy is far more complicated than it seems at first view.3 There are 
especially two complications that need to be mentioned. The first one is rather 
simple, and might even not be considered an objection to the reproach of a du-
alistic opposition between reality and philosophy. This complication arises from 
the inner ambivalence of this opposition itself: The discourse of philosophy is 
criticised as a discourse on the apparent independence of its concepts, and fol-
lowing Marx, these apparent concepts would need to be replaced by an empir-
icist scientific approach. One recognises the famous broad opposition between 
science and ideology, as Althusser maintained. Within this opposition, then, a 
certain empiricist positivism is implied, directed against the nebulous concepts 
of philosophy, but once we focus on philosophy as the highest form of ideology, 
the opposition between philosophy and science indicates a conflict on the level 
of concepts, and therefore a conflict about the true concept. The apparent con-
flict between philosophy and science is a conflict on the level of concepts.
The second complication concerns the determination of the juxtaposed reality. 
Contrary to what one might suppose, the self-referential world of philosophy 
is not criticised by reference to reality as the essential being of the world. The 
concept of reality that Marx proposes escapes any essentialism. The reality Marx 
refers to is a reality of relations, in which the human being is understood to live 
under the condition of specific circumstances. The most distinct example is to 
be found in Marx’s definition of the human being as a species-being in the Paris 
Manuscripts.4 The concept of reality that is developed in the early Marx can be 
understood as a concept of the conditionality of anything that exists – anything 
that is only exists in the context of specific circumstances and under specific 
conditions. Even if certain moments of positivism and empiricism are implied in 
the arguments, the interesting and theoretically valid point is not reference to 
the facts, but rather reference to the fact that any fact is related and conditioned. 
3 See Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, in: Marx/Engels, Werke, Vol. 3 
(MEW 3), Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED (ed.), Dietz-Verlag, Berlin 
1978, p. 20.
4 “Man is a species-being, not only because he practically and theoretically makes the spe-
cies – both his own and those of other things – his object, but also – and this is simply 
another way of saying the same thing – because he looks upon himself as the present, 
living species, because he looks upon himself as a universal and therefore free being.” Karl 
Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), in: Early Writings, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone, Penguin Books, London 1992, pp. 279–400, here p. 327.
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This does not save Marx’s argument from the general suspicion of metaphysical 
nuances, but it does refute the objection of positivism.
If thus the true pair of opposites in the early Marx is the pair of Reality and Ide-
ology, we get a relation in which one side, reality, is defined as a conditionality 
and relationality, while the other side, Ideology, is defined as self-referential or 
precisely as the interruption of any relationality or conditionality. We find an 
opposition between relationality and autonomy, and the problem is that this 
opposition occurs as a relation itself. For, as we have already seen in the critical 
content of the notion of ideology – namely the connection between the critique 
of the inversion of the mind-world relation and the critique of the apparent au-
tonomy of the concept – the opposition between relationality and autonomy is 
itself the outcome of a process; its forms are forms of a development. The reality 
that Marx invokes against the self-relation of philosophy is at the same time the 
reality that conditions this self-relation. It is the same reality on both sides. And 
this reality is, in the end, the division of labour – the beginning of all human 
relationality in the sexual act5 – which finds its purest form in the division of 
reality and philosophy, a division in which the side of philosophy will be able to 
understand itself only in relation to itself. Philosophy is the split of the relation 
in that specific sense that it does not negate the question of relation, but it is a 
perversion, taking relation to be a self-relation.
But if this opposition is then to be understood to be the result of a development, 
this does not only imply that the apparent autonomy of philosophy is condi-
tioned by reality, it also means that the apparent autonomy of philosophy is 
itself a part of reality. And then again, reality cannot be taken as a negation of 
philosophy, although, from the point of view of reality, philosophy negates real-
ity. From its own point of view, philosophy negates that there is something else. 
Thus, in this couple, reality and philosophy, negation is found on the side of 
philosophy, while one would have to admit that reality affirms even the reality of 
5 “This sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development and extension 
through increased productivity, the increase of needs, and, what is fundamental to both of 
these, the increase of population. With these there develops the division of labour, which 
was originally nothing but the division of labour in the sexual act, then the division of la-
bour which develops spontaneously or ‘naturally’ by virtue of natural predisposition (e.g., 
physical strength), needs, accidents, etc., etc.” Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, The German 
Ideology, Prometheus, New York, NY 1998, p. 50.
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philosophy, although it affirms the reality of philosophy as that of a split. Reality 
affirms the reality of its other, namely philosophy, while philosophy negates the 
reality of the other. This negation is, from the point of view of reality, a dissoci-
ation – philosophy dissociates itself from reality, while reality is defined as the 
contrary: reality is an association, including the existence of the other. Reality 
affirms itself as an other, it is a different same.
The problem we are left with in the early Marx is then the following: if reality is 
considered to be conditioned and within relations, we could not only wonder 
whether this opens the path for a general relativism, but we might also ask why 
the non-relationality and self-relation of philosophy cannot simply be under-
stood as another turn of the development of reality. If philosophy exists as a 
part of reality, why should reality be opposed to the ideological version of phi-
losophy? At this point it might seem suitable to open the question of right and 
wrong. A possible answer to this problem might then be: Even if philosophy is 
a specific part of reality – even if it is real, in other words – philosophy presents 
a false understanding of reality. But the reference to right and wrong, false and 
true, is no real solution, because the definition of reality precisely contradicts 
any claim to a correct representation. Reality does not refer to an identity, and 
therefore it cannot be identified in a false or correct manner. So, the question 
remains: Why not reduce ideology to a part of reality, and why not claim an 
absolute relationality that even implies the self-relationality of ideology? How 
do we escape an absolute relationality? It is an absolute relationality that brings 
about two problems – on the one hand, a para-metaphysical claim as to the re-
lationality of all being, and on the other hand, the proposal of an identification 
of reality as such – and thereby produces a contradiction in terms. So how do we 
escape an absolute relationality that would leave us in the abyss of an absolute 
contradiction, the abyss of a self-contradictory metaphysical claim?
2
In a very famous passage in Sophist, the discussion between the Stranger and 
Theaetetus examines the gigantomachy between those who believe that only 
bodies have a being and those who believe that only ideas have a being. After 
showing that those who believe in the material being of everything have to ad-
mit that there is at least something that exists and is not material, that there is 
at least a certain dynamis, a power that exists and is not material, the Stranger 
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proves that also the ‘friends of ideas’ need to accept that reason is in movement. 
But if reason is in movement, this leads to the problem that reason is in general 
considered to be at rest – stable, we could say – while at the same time it is 
proven to be in movement, because it has a soul.
This brings about a new problem, for the result cannot be that something is at 
rest and is in motion. If they were, then rest and movement either would both 
have to be moving or both would have to be at rest, which cannot be. So they 
are, but they are not the same. The consequence is then that being has to be 
considered as a category apart from movement and rest. If we understand rest 
and movement as the categories of identity and change, we can see that ‘at rest’ 
is that which refers only to itself – what is identical – and this is why reason, the 
example we began with, has to be ‘at rest’, if it is not supposed to change at any 
moment. But as reason also has a soul and a life, reason is also in movement, 
or, put differently, reason changes. But identity and change are neither identi-
cal nor both in movement. So we receive identity, change, and being as three 
categories on the same level.
From here we come to the problem between the one and the many. As we usu-
ally describe the one with many determinations – we describe one person with 
many characteristics – the question now turns into the question of whether 
everything needs to be kept apart in its one-ness or whether everything needs 
to be mixed. Is there only identity, or is everything in movement and changing 
continuously?
One can see that this question already addresses the difficult relation between 
the three categories of rest, movement, and being. If they are as categories only 
at rest, or if they simply rest identical with themselves, if no participation is 
possible, if nothing is mixed, then movement and rest could not participate in 
being. But then again, if everything is mixed, we end up with the contradiction 
of rest being moved and movement being at rest. The Stranger wants to avoid 
any of these contradictions, and therefore it can only be that some things mix 
and others do not. 
To further understand this problem, the Stranger suggests adding two more 
categories, namely that of the same and that of the other: because the already 
secured categories of movement, rest, and being differ from each other but 
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are also in a relation of sameness to themselves. This means the categories of 
sameness and otherness spring from the first line of categories; they are already 
comprised within them. And as the categories of rest, movement, and being 
cannot be subsumed under the new categories of sameness and difference, the 
latter have to be further categories, so that in the end we have five categories: 
Rest, Movement, Being, Same, Other. The category of the other passes, as the 
Stranger argues, throughout all the other categories, insofar as each category 
differs from the other categories, every category is an other in relation to the 
other categories. If we then take the specific example of movement, we see that 
movement is different from being, movement and being are not identical, and 
then we have to admit that we find in the category of movement something that 
is not being, or: there is something in movement which is not. But if non-being 
exists in movement, we can also conclude that non-being exists throughout 
all the other categories. The existence of non-being, which here is indirectly 
proven, is the overall goal of this argument, because the problem of the catego-
risation of the sophist led the dialogue to the examination of the appearance, 
and afterwards to the problem of the existence of non-being, and now finally we 
receive otherness as a category that proves that non-being exists.
In this system of five categories we can discern a doubled set of structures. On 
the one hand, the five categories are systemised on one level. All the categories 
follow in one series; they are all necessary on their own, as they are all differ-
ent from the others, but they also participate in the other categories. But on 
the other hand, the reason for this systematisation is already the inscription of 
a second series, the series of sameness and otherness, which opens a second 
layer of the same structure. This second layer brings the structure of sameness 
and otherness to the fore, according to criteria that are found within the first 
structure – rest, movement, being.
The specifics of this constellation can be seen more clearly in Hegel’s very in-
teresting reading of this passage of Sophist. The point Hegel is referring to in an 
incisive manner takes place some moments later in the discussion between the 
Stranger and Theaetetus. After they have established the five categories, the 
Stranger remarks that it is difficult and beautiful at the same time to consider 
the same as different or the different as the same, which is possible from a spe-
cific perspective that one might have on a certain thing.
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To quote Plato, one needs “to be able to follow the things that are said both 
whenever someone says it to be the same while it is other in a sense, and when-
ever someone says it to be other while it is the same, and show by examination 
in case by case that it’s in that sense and according to that that either of them 
has been affected as the speaker says it has.”6
Hegel refers to this passage, but gives it a specific twist. In his Lectures on the 
History of Philosophy, Hegel says: “Plato says definitively that what is other – 
το ἐτερον – is also the same (ἀυτον) or the self-identical, and what is the same 
(self-identical) is the other too, and indeed in one and the same respect (and not 
in such a way as to confute and contradict one another), and according to the 
same aspect, so that they are identical.”7
As can be seen quite clearly, Hegel adjusts Plato’s claim to his own systematic 
point, and even explicitly rejects the aspect of relation that Plato was actually 
referring to, when pointing out that things are said in a sense. For Plato, the 
same can be the other and the other can be the same according to different rela-
tions from a subjective point of view. With Hegel, sameness and otherness are 
integrated into the same process that becomes other. But it is not only the sub-
jective account that is deleted; a further relation is also withdrawn. Indirectly, 
for Plato, the sense is a relation that orients the possibility of something same 
becoming something other. So that something same can become something oth-
er in relation to the sense in which it is taken.
 
But let us take one example in which this logic in its Hegelian change is played 
out, the famous example of the dialectic between Lordship and Bondage from 
6 Plato, Sophist, in: The Being of the Beautiful, Plato’s Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman, 
trans. Seth Benardete, University of Chicago Press, Chicago/London 1984, 259c-d. Empha-
sis added.
7 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. II: Greek Philosophy, trans. Robert 
F. Brown, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2006, p. 201. In German, the passage reads: “Platon 
spricht es so aus: das, was das Andere ist, ist das Negative überhaupt, – dies ist Dasselbe, 
das mit sich Identische; das Andere ist das Nichtidentische, und dies Dasselbe ist ebenso 
das Andere, und zwar in ein und derselben Rücksicht. Es sind nicht verschiedene Seiten, 
nicht im Widerspruch bleibend; sondern sie sind diese Einheit in einer und derselben 
Rücksicht, und nach der einen Seite, daß das Eine von ihnen gesetzt ist, sind sie identisch 
nach derselben Seite.” G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II, in: 
G.W.F. Hegel, Werke Vol. 19, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1971, p. 75.
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Phenomenology. Hegel introduces the dialectic between the Lord and the Bonds-
man as the confrontation of a consciousness with another consciousness, or as 
the confrontation of the one with the other, indicating thereby that we are enter-
ing the realm of forms of self-consciousness that act as a multiplicity of living 
forms of the I and the We.
“The Lord is the consciousness that exists for itself,” as Hegel writes, but as 
this existence for itself, the Lord exists as mediated through another, and this 
is how the Lord is related to the Bondsman, “mediately”.8 The Lord is in an 
immediate relation to himself, mediated by his relation to the Bondsman. The 
Bondsman, however, works on the thing, which he is not able to fully negate, 
and therefore the thing rests independent of him. Out of a first moment of mutu-
al recognition, insofar as both Lord and Bondsman act out of a certain incapa-
bility towards the thing, there results a first inversion. In his consciousness, the 
Lord is dependent on the servant: “The truth of the independent consciousness 
is accordingly the servile consciousness of the bondsman.”9 In the next step 
Hegel shows how the Bondsman will also invert his relation to himself. It is 
through the work on the thing that he is able to relate to himself. In opposition 
to the Lord, his work is an act of realisation: What the Lord can only desire and 
then only enjoy via the mediation of the servant, the servant does actually work 
upon. He is able to hinder the desire, to interrupt the consumption of the thing, 
by working on it. Instead of the disappearance caused by the Lord, the Bonds-
man can create permanence. But at the same time the Bondsman is affected 
by fear, as he now realises that he ‘exists in his own right’, that he has his own 
consciousness. Between that fear and the formative activity that the servant 
unfolds, he needs to establish a skill with which some things can be mastered, 
but not the thing in general, not the generality of the thing. Instead of a general 
master, the servant becomes the skilful master of many things.
This famous scene puts the accent on the mutual recognition of the other in 
the same and the same in the other, and this structure is organised around 
the thing. Via the mediation of the thing, the one and the other are led to the 
recognition that the other is the same, and that the same is the other. The other 
8 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford University Press, Oxford/
New York 1977, p. 115.
9 Ibid., p. 117.
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consciousness is a consciousness, too, and the consciousness itself is related 
to the other consciousness as well. They are the same, insofar as they both act 
upon the thing and are both dependent. They are others, insofar as the Lord 
actually finds his truth in the dependent servant and insofar as the servant 
effectively masters the thing through his work. Self-relation is relation to the 
other, mediated by the thing.
If we compare this situation to the relation of the same and the other in Plato, 
we recognise that the process is arranged in a different direction. We can list 
the moments of difference: Firstly, the contradiction is a necessary part of the 
process, as the scene of recognition is not only some random event, but neces-
sary for the unfolding of the consciousness as self-consciousness – and thus 
the scene describes the unfolding and the sublation of a contradiction. Second-
ly, the relation between the one and the other is a symmetrical relation with 
the complicated thing in its middle. Thirdly, there exist differences between 
the sides of the master and the slave, but these differences are not organised, 
are not formalised. We see, for example, that the servant in the end is better 
off, because he is actually able to establish permanence, to create a world. So it 
is a dissymmetrical scene that via a mutual recognition and via a symmetrical 
contradiction is led into an inversed dissymmetry. But a part of the dissymme-
try cannot be referred to the dialectic of the one and the other; rather a certain 
contingency is inscribed from the beginning that moves the symmetrical scene.
In Plato there is a dialectic that is organised around the question of senses and 
that refuses to inscribe the contradiction as it also refuses to localise the other. 
In Hegel there is a dialectic that is organised around the contradiction and that 
finds its transport in the mediation of the thing, but that refuses to inscribe the 
sense as it also refuses to localise a specific sense – because as soon as one 
position is taken it will develop into its other. Hegel thus localises the contra-
diction, but refuses, in some sense, to localise the same and the other, as the 
same is only the same in its very being the other.
 
There are two questions that might be raised at this point, namely: a) How do 
these two different organisations of dialectic relate to each other?; and b) Where 
do we find Marx in this situation? 
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3
Marx, as we saw, thinks reality as opposed to a real existing ideology. This 
opposition is asymmetrical insofar as it is, as we saw, a relation of different 
relations: The side of reality is a relation to the other; the side of ideology is 
the relation to the self. From a structural point of view, ideology is not related 
in the same way to its other as reality is. Both sides, the side of reality and the 
side of ideology, actually refer to their others according to a specific sense. The 
position taken by ideology is the dismissal of any otherness. The position taken 
by the side of reality is not the dismissal of sameness, but the affirmation of 
otherness. It is thus actually the structure of dissymmetry that allows different 
positions to arise. Hegel, however, dismisses the inscription of a position and 
develops the dialectic into the form of a contradiction within one process. The 
difference that organised the relation between one and the other in Plato there-
by becomes the contradiction that moves the process in Hegel.
In Plato, the difficulty with the question of non-being is resolved by an analysis 
of differences, but the result – that non-being exists – is nevertheless trouble-
some, because indirectly the question of the contradiction persists in Plato. It 
is hidden and dissolved on the surface, but one of the conclusions from Plato’s 
result is, of course, the existence of non-being in being itself, a conclusion that 
amounts to a contradiction but which is not directly examined as that. Further-
more, we find in Plato the constellation of two layers of thought that are not 
even two different layers: In the first series of concepts there was movement, 
rest, and being, and then sameness and otherness, as further categories, are 
drawn from this series. In the first series, ‘being’ was introduced as a further 
category because being could not be understood as a higher category that would 
comprehend rest and movement. Being as a category did not subsume rest and 
movement as its lower categories. The categories of the same and the other refer 
to the relation between the categories of the first series; they are not a proper 
addition, but rather a conclusion from within. But then Plato adds these cate-
gories within the first series, and this presents a specific ambivalence: On the 
one hand, a contradiction is inscribed between being and non-being, between 
the first series and the second series, but on the other hand, this contradiction 
is reduced to a set of differences.
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In his interpretation Hegel focuses on the contradiction and radically restruc-
tures the process, but he misses the organisation of differences and as well 
misses the question of the positioning. The question of the position, to remark 
on the side, is not a question of the subject, but it is rather a question of the 
multiplicity of conflicts. For Plato, it is actually possible that there are different 
accounts of the same thing, as the one or the other, according to different po-
sitions, and this enables him to say in the end that there are different conflicts 
that relate to each other as being the same or other. The question of the subject 
in Plato should rather be localised at the void point of the hidden-but-present 
contradiction within the set of differences. 
What about Marx, then? As we saw, Marx localises the contradiction in the set 
of philosophy and reality, although he also accounts for both sides being a part 
of reality. But it is only from the side of reality that philosophy can be localised 
as a specific part of reality. Thus we find a structure of a sense or of a position 
inscribed, but we also find the Platonic order of differences. Finally, the contra-
diction is then also inscribed: because it is actually the self-referential discourse 
of philosophy that rejects and contradicts reality, and it is at this point that the 
contradiction appears. In Plato, the other did not contradict the same, it was 
simply other than the same, but it did also participate in the same. Bourgeois 
philosophy is other than that, it does not participate in something else; it only 
refers to itself, it understands itself as a different type of sameness, and therefore 
it opens the contradiction that the same is not the same. Bourgeois philosophy, 
dissociating itself from reality, opens the contradiction on the plane of reality. 
Marx can thus be said to rearrange the dialectical question of differences and 
contradiction. This is not simply a question of an addition, it might rather be the 
result of a different position. Marx – this is where we began – opens a discourse 
that seeks to withdraw from philosophy. But this withdrawal from philosophy 
is built on the conviction of the conditionality of any discourse. Marx can then 
structure his own discourse on this immanent gap of any discourse, namely 
that any discourse relies on conditions and is inscribed into relations. Strictly 
speaking, this is the point at which the contradiction sets in: The discourse of 
philosophy is preceded by something that it is not able to grasp. Of course, we 
could ask why the same issue should not be applied to Marx’s own discourse 
of ‘reality’. Is not the Marxian discourse itself founded on conditions and set 
into relations, and would not this open an endless series in which in the end 
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everything becomes the same? But it is the localisation of the contradiction that 
escapes such relativism here. Bourgeois philosophy finds itself conditioned 
by something it cannot oversee, and Marx presents this contradiction as the 
discourse of reality. Therefore, the conditionality is specific, and not general. 
Marx’s discourse is not one of the general conditionality of any discourse, but a 
discourse on the concrete determination of the specific discourse of bourgeois 
philosophy. It can be such because it exits philosophy, because it understands 
itself as a specific discourse. To open this contradiction, to make it visible, he 
needs to take a position outside the discourse of philosophy as the discourse of 
the general. He needs to present an other thought, a specific thought that is no 
longer burdened by the generality of the philosophical discourse. More specifi-
cally, we see that the Marxian discourse operates its exit from philosophy with-
in philosophy: it presents a specific discourse within philosophy as its other.
At this point we have the structure of a set of differences within one thought 
in Plato, we have the structure of a contradiction within one thought in Hegel, 
and now we find the presentation of an inner exterior thought in Marx as the 
combination of difference and contradiction. The contradiction is the real con-
dition of thought; it is therefore the conditionality of thought that appears on 
the plane of reality.
And here we see that something gets lost in Marx, because he thinks it is enough 
to take this position on the side of reality and to not draw consequences from the 
fact that this position on the side of reality is a position taken within thought. 
Marx posits the contradiction as a pure position, an act, which he considers 
to be an act of conditionality. But with this act, started within philosophy, he 
moves outside philosophy and proposes the opposition of reality to philosophy 
as a contradiction that appears between thought and reality. And a contradic-
tion outside thought, a contradiction even posited against thought is unwill-
ingly sent back to the relation of the one and the other. And so we are sent back 
to the relation of the one and the other, although this time we see that the real 
contradiction is linked to a position, to a sense.
 
The position changes the order of the given facts and inscribes the contradiction 
into the reality of differences; it is what allows for the beginning of an asym-
metrical relation. This then is what Plato was incapable of articulating, that 
the beginning of the asymmetry, the position, unfolds as a contradiction in the 
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very moment that the thing is not simply an object viewed in different relations, 
rather the thing effectively changes the relation between the one and the other. 
This is what Hegel sees: the different relations unfold an effectivity of their own, 
and he inscribes this effectivity into the contradictory thing and suspends the 
question of the differences of positions. But once the contradiction is the other 
of thought, it falls back into the structure of the one and the other. In Hegel it 
will be the other of the one, and here we risk the sameness of symmetry and 
contradiction. But this symmetry is excessive, because it prepares for the con-
tradiction to exist, and once it exists, it is already again the other of the one. It 
is impossible for the contradiction to escape the logic of thought, the logic of 
the other and the one. But it also impossible for the contradiction not to be, and 
where it appears, it prepares for the excess. This is the circulation of dialectics.
Marx then seeks to reintroduce the position as the proper formulation of the con-
tradiction; he enables the contradiction to appear, but at the same time sends 
it back to the relation of the one and the other. The appearance nevertheless is 
necessary, because it marks the excess of dialectics itself. This is, so to speak, 
the dialectics of circulation.
Dialectics thus presents itself as a process that thinks itself. At any time in this 
process there are three positions to be thought, the positions of Plato, Hegel, 
and Marx. Plato is only fully understood once he is read via Hegel and Marx, He-
gel is only fully understood once he is read via Plato and Marx, and Marx finally 
is only fully understood once he is read via Plato and Hegel.
At any point we can think dialectics fully and understand it. But it will always 
be a rational understanding that is bound and connected to a position, to a real 
conditionality of thought, and it will always again have to solve the riddle of 
the relation between the differences and the contradiction, which can only be 
solved as a real position.
 
Dialectics, as a real figure of thought, finds its reality therefore in a politics that 
presents us this specific problem of the relation between differences and contra-
diction. This problem is known under the name of democracy, in Plato, in Hegel, 
but also in Marx. Dialectics thinks itself; this then also means that it presents 
the reality of democracy precisely as a real contradiction. The name we might 
put here may be left in suspension. 
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